On Tuesday, November 24, Quad9 will stop answering DNS queries that come from France. The Swiss foundation behind 9.9.9.9 announced the withdrawal on October 22, one day after the Paris judicial court attached a penalty of 1,000 euros a day to an order telling it to block 58 domain names for the sports broadcaster beIN. Quad9 has refused to block any of them, and it would sooner drop a country than start.
If 9.9.9.9, 149.112.112.112 or dns.quad9.net is configured on a machine, a router or a phone that reaches the internet through a French address, name resolution there is about to break, and the last section lists where to look. To leave, Quad9 first has to decide who is in France. It has no accounts, so "a user in France" can only mean "a query whose source address geolocates to France", and its CTO wrote on Hacker News that geoIP filters are the probable mechanism. Quad9 told the court that this technique could not be made to work. We went through the judgment, the registry data and our own lookups to see who such a filter catches.
A 1,000 euro penalty on an order that ended on November 14
The case is about tennis. beIN Sports France broadcasts the WTA tour, whose 2026 season ran from January 2 to November 14. On May 13, 2026, the president of the Paris tribunal judiciaire used article L.333-10 of the French Sports Code to order Quad9 to prevent access to pirate IPTV services carrying those matches, starting with six domain names. The regulator ARCOM notified more names afterwards, and by September 22 the list stood at 58.
Quad9 did nothing and said so. Its CTO gave the court a statement dated September 25 that none of the names had been blocked on that date or at any time before it. beIN asked for 10,000 euros per day and per domain, which is where the figure of 580,000 euros a day comes from. The judgment of October 21 (RG 26/11882) set 1,000 euros a day in total, running until the measures ended with the last match on November 14. Quad9 puts the bill at 24,000 euros.
Two paragraphs of the judgment matter beyond this case. In paragraph 16 the judge writes that Quad9 claims it cannot carry out geolocated blocking but "does not demonstrate it" (elle ne le démontre pas). In paragraph 18 he describes the duty as an obligation of means: Quad9 was expected to try. Earlier in October the Paris court had refused beIN's penalty requests against Cloudflare and several VPN providers, which had blocked at least some of the names.
So the order behind the exit has already lapsed. The foundation is leaving because, by its own count, about 20 more French cases are pending, and because of what happened in Germany. During its dispute with Sony Music it used geoIP blocking as a stopgap. Quad9 says Sony then reached the blocked name from Germany through a VPN, and the court fined the foundation for contempt.
A resolver sees a source address and a question
Quad9 answers from more than 200 sites in 90 countries, all announcing the same anycast prefixes. On November 18 at 11:59 UTC, from an Orange line in Île-de-France (AS3215), id.server on 9.9.9.9 came back as res714.cdg, so the query was served in Paris. Switching the French sites off would not remove French users. BGP would deliver the same queries to the next closest site, and Quad9's CTO wrote that "French law does not care if the servers are in France or anywhere else", only where the users are.
The decision therefore has to be made per query, from the source address. DNS over TLS or HTTPS hides the question from the networks in between, but Quad9 still sees where the connection comes from, and that is often a different machine from the one where somebody typed the name.
The office is the case a country filter gets wrong. Companies run internal DNS servers that forward to a public resolver, and the forwarded query leaves from wherever the company's internet egress is, which for a branch in Lyon can be a firewall in Frankfurt. On a phone, the address is one slot in a carrier-grade NAT pool.
Above the list of French networks it published with the announcement (DINUM, RENATER, EDF, SNCF), Quad9 wrote that autonomous systems "are not exclusively geographically-mapped and cannot be used as a jurisdictional identifier". A filter by AS number is out, then, and what remains is the geolocation of the source prefix.
Where "France" stops in the registry data
The May order defines its territory with more care than a country code can express. It covers access from French territory, including the overseas departments, regions and collectivities and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, "with the exception of the territories of New Caledonia, the Wallis and Futuna islands and French Polynesia". It adds access by users "by reason of a contract subscribed in this territory" (our translation).
ISO 3166-1 gives most of those places a code of their own, and the regional registries file addresses under them (the registered country of a block). In the registry statistics of November 16, as served by RIPEstat, 81.6 million IPv4 addresses are registered under FR. Another 701,952 sit under the eight codes of territories the order covers (RE, GP, MQ, GF, YT, PM, BL, MF), and 240,640 under the three it leaves out (NC, PF, WF). They do not even share a registry: the list includes blocks issued by the RIPE NCC (Martinique), AFRINIC (Réunion), LACNIC (French Guiana), ARIN (Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon) and APNIC (New Caledonia).
Geolocation databases then make their own choice. A database can return the territory's ISO code, or return FR and put the territory in the region field. When we looked up 43.224.192.1, an address of New Caledonia's Office des Postes et Télécommunications (AS18200), our API answered with France as the country and Nouvelle-Calédonie as the region. A filter on the country alone would refuse Nouméa, which the court left out. A filter on FR against a database that returns RE would keep serving Saint-Denis de La Réunion, which the court included.
Then come the people whose address and location disagree.
The contract clause was written for ISPs, which know their subscribers, and Quad9 has no contract with anyone. It still fits roaming rather well. A French SIM in Madrid is home-routed, so its traffic leaves from the French operator's network and a country filter refuses it. A visitor in Paris on a travel eSIM usually exits in another country and keeps resolving. So does anyone in France on a VPN with a foreign exit, which is how Sony got around the German block.
What a withdrawn resolver looks like from a French line
Quad9 has not said what a French network will receive on Tuesday. TorrentFreak reported on October 22 that the method "hasn't been decided yet", and Mullvad told its users on November 17 that "Quad9 will refuse DNS requests from France". We cannot test a filter that does not exist yet.
The precedent is OpenDNS, which left France on June 28, 2024 over a Canal+ order under the same article of the Sports Code. We queried it from the same Orange line as the Quad9 test above, at the same time, and decoded the response:
server 208.67.222.222 (OpenDNS), UDP port 53
query ipregistry.co. IN A
status REFUSED, 0 answers, 15 ms
EDE 16 (Censored)
TXT "The OpenDNS service is currently unavailable in France and
some French territories due to a court order under Article
L.333-10 of the French Sport Code. See
https://support.opendns.com/hc/en-us" The notice says "some French territories" without naming them.
A REFUSED is the kind version of a cutoff. A stub resolver that gets one moves on to the next configured server at once, so a machine with only Quad9 addresses fails fast and a machine with a second resolver loses a round trip. If the filter drops packets instead, every lookup first waits for a timeout (five seconds per attempt with glibc defaults). Encrypted setups have no second choice. Android's Private DNS with dns.quad9.net as the hostname does not fall back to the network's resolver, and neither does Firefox in Max Protection mode. The extended error code 16 shows in dig, while a browser shows its usual "server not found" page.
OpenDNS in 2024, Quad9 in 2026, Belgium in January
Cisco pulled OpenDNS out of France and Portugal in June 2024 and out of Belgium in April 2025, and it has told the Belgian anti-piracy department that it will leave that country a second time. On August 20, 2026, the Brussels business court upheld the order that DAZN obtained against Cisco, Google and Cloudflare: 100,000 euros per match day, capped at 20 million euros per company. Cloudflare's post of November 17 puts the deadline in early January 2027 and says the three companies have appealed.
The Belgian decision has a sentence with no equivalent in the Paris judgment: penalties do not apply to under-blocking caused by "an exceptional geolocation error". We think that is the realistic standard. Locating a fixed line at country level is the most dependable thing IP data does, and it still cannot see through a VPN, a forwarder or a roaming agreement. A German court fined Quad9 over that gap, and the Paris court asked for an effort that Quad9 declined to make. Whether French judges will treat a withdrawal that leaks more kindly than a block that leaks has not been tested, and Quad9's CTO concedes "the possibility that we will have errors in our blockade".
What to check before Tuesday
Quad9 cannot notify anyone, since it does not know who its users are, and its resolver sits in places nobody remembers choosing. Mullvad announced in September that it was shutting down its own public DNS servers, with a November 2 deadline to switch away from them, and that Mullvad Browser's default DNS would move to Quad9. On November 17 it was telling browser users in France to pick another DNS over HTTPS provider, turn the setting off or use its VPN.
If you run machines behind French addresses, search for 9.9.9.9, 9.9.9.10, 149.112.112.112, 2620:fe::fe, 2620:fe::9 and dns.quad9.net in these places:
/etc/resolv.conf, systemd-resolved and NetworkManager profiles, and the DNS option of your DHCP scopes- the forwarders of Unbound, dnsmasq, Pi-hole, AdGuard Home, Windows DNS and CoreDNS
- Docker's
daemon.jsonand container images built with a fixed resolver - WAN settings on routers and firewalls, branch sites included
- Android Private DNS, Apple DNS profiles and browser secure DNS policies pushed by MDM
- appliances, cameras and other devices that ship with a hard-coded resolver
grep -rIE '9\.9\.9\.[0-9]+|149\.112\.112\.|2620:fe::|quad9' /etc 2>/dev/null
resolvectl status | grep -i 'dns'
kubectl -n kube-system get configmap coredns -o yaml | grep -A2 forward If you need a replacement, 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8 and DNS4EU's 86.54.11.100 all answered normally from the same Orange line on November 18 at 12:09 UTC.
The filter follows the egress address, wherever the owner is. A virtual machine in a Paris cloud region or a VPN concentrator in Marseille will be refused even if the company behind it is in Berlin, and a French company whose traffic leaves through Frankfurt will keep its answers until Quad9 tunes its list. Quad9 has not said which geolocation source it will use, so check your egress addresses against more than one.
Ipregistry returns the country and region an address geolocates to, the network that announces it, and whether it is a VPN, proxy or relay exit, which is how your egress addresses will look to a country filter like the one Quad9 is about to switch on. You can look them up with 20,000 free lookups to get started.
Keep users in the loop Ship release notes that get read. Try Noticeable